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EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT MAIZE MARKETING POLICIES ON 
MAIZE MARKET PRICES IN KENYA 
 
1.  Introduction 
Kenyan policy makers are confronted with a classic “food price dilemma” 
surrounding their most important food crop, maize. On one hand there is pressure to 
ensure that maize farmers receive adequate price incentives to produce and market their 
crop.  On the other hand, the food security of a growing urban population, and of many 
rural households who are buyers of maize, requires keeping maize prices low.  For many 
years policy makers have attempted to strike a balance between these two competing 
objectives, primarily through the operations of the National Cereals and Produce Board 
(NCPB) which procures and sells maize at administratively determined prices. Since 
1988 a private sector marketing channel has competed with the NCPB with prices in the 
private sector being set by supply and demand forces. The effects of the NCPB’s 
marketing activities on the level and variability of maize market prices in the private 
sector channel are controversial and not well understood. Given the importance of maize 
in the Kenyan economy, empirical research on the historical effects of NCPB activities 
will provide a better understanding of the past impact of these policies, and also inform 
the debate about the appropriate future role for the NCPB.  
The objective of this paper is to estimate the historical effects of NCPB maize 
trading activities on private sector maize price levels and variability.  We also discuss the 
probable income transfer effects of the NCPB’s maize trading operations.  The analysis 
uses monthly data covering the period January 1989 through October 2004.  It was not 
possible to use a fully structural econometric model to estimate the historical policy 
effects because of data limitations in Kenya, which are typical of many developing 
countries.  Instead we use a vector autoregression model (VAR) and show how policy 
simulation results can be obtained from a fairly parsimonious VAR estimated with sparse 
data and imposing only minimal identification restrictions. 
2.   Methodology 
  Estimating the effects of NCPB marketing activities on private sector maize 
prices in Kenya over a historical period is a difficult task.  Data are limited, the objectives 
of government policy have probably changed over time, and a traditional structural   3
econometric approach is not feasible in the current context because prices are the only 
reliable market data available. 
  Faced with these problems we take a VAR approach (Sims, 1980, Fackler, 1988, 
Myers, Piggott, and Tomek, 1990).  VAR models have proven to be useful for estimating 
policy effects in the presence of limited data and/or uncertainty about the correct 
structural model that is generating observed data. The approach has been applied mainly 
to macroeconomic policy but has also been applied successfully to study the effects of 
commodity marketing policies (e.g. Myers, Piggott, and Tomek, 1990). 
  To outline the VAR approach, suppose we observe a vector of market 
variables t y we want to simulate under alternative policy scenarios. We also observe a 
vector of policy variables t p  that the government uses to attempt to influence t y .  A 
general dynamic model of the relationship between the variables can be written as: 
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where the , B   i B ,  i C ,
y A  and  , D   i D ,  i G ,
p A  are matrices of unknown parameters, k is 
the maximum number of lags allowed in any equation, and 
y
t u and 
p
t u  are vectors of  
mutually uncorrelated “structural” innovations representing random shocks to the 
fundamental supply, demand, and policy processes that are generating data for t y  
and t p .
1       
                                                   
1 The assumption that each structural error vector contains mutually uncorrelated errors is not restrictive 
because the  y A  and  p A  matrices allow each shock to enter every equation in the block.  The assumption 
that  p
t u  is also uncorrelated with  y
t u is also not restrictive because independence from current market 
conditions is part of the definition of an exogenous policy shock (see Bernanke and Mihov, 1998). 
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   This system is currently underidentfied but Bernanke and Mihov (1998) suggest 
that a natural identification restriction in this context is to set  0 = 0 C , which excludes 
policy shocks from influencing market variables within the current period.  Bernanke and 
Blinder (1992) have shown that if  0 = 0 C  then the effect of a policy shock on market 
variables is independent of the B  and 
y A parameter matrices, which implies that 
estimates of policy effects on market variables will be robust to any alternative 
identification scheme that might be used for the market variables block. However, policy 
effects will still be sensitive to the restrictions used to identifyD,  0 G , and
p A  in the 
policy block.  The most common identification scheme used in VAR models is the 
Choleski factorization which imposes a recursive ordering among variables (Sims, 
1980).
2 In our context this would imply
p A  is restricted to be diagonal and  D to be lower 
triangular with ones on the diagonal (with  0 G  left unrestricted).  Alternative orderings 
for the policy variables then imply alternative identifications. 
  Once an identification scheme has been chosen the model can be estimated in two 
steps. First, estimate the reduced form of the system using ordinary least squares. Second 
take the reduced form residual covariance matrix and solve for the unknown 
contemporaneous structural parameters. These estimation procedures are explained in 
detail elsewhere (e.g. Fackler, 1988; Myers, Piggott and Tomek, 1990). 
  Having estimated the model then impulse response analysis can be used to trace 
out the dynamic response of all variables in the system to a typical innovation in a 
particular policy variable (see Hamilton, 1994).  Furthermore, if we set all structural 
innovations except the policy innovations to their historical values, and then control the 
sequence of policy innovations in order to generate specific historical paths for the policy 
variables, we can simulate what the effects of alternative policies would have been over 
the sample period.  
 
 
                                                   
2 It is important to note that this restriction only applies to contemporaneous interactions between the 
variables.  Dynamic interactions in the model remain unrestricted.   5
3.   Application to Kenyan Maize Prices  
 
  The first step in applying the VAR methodology to estimate policy effects on 
Kenyan maize prices is to choose variables to include in the t y and t p  vectors.  Two 
regional wholesale prices in Kenya are included in the t y vector—the wholesale price in 
the maize breadbasket district of Kitale and the wholesale price in the main consumption 
region of Nairobi. In most years there is potential for significant cross-border maize trade 
between Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, usually in the form of imports into Kenya.  
Mbale is a major market in Eastern Uganda that is important in cross-border trade with 
Kenya, and interactions are expected between Mbale and Kenyan prices.  Hence, 
wholesale price in Mbale is also included in the t y vector.   
  For the t p  vector we want variables that represent the operation of Kenyan maize 
price policy. The NCPB manages domestic maize prices by buying maize in surplus 
producing regions at an administratively determined purchase price, transporting it to 
major consumption regions, and selling it at an administratively determined sell price.  
Hence, the NCPB influences prices in two main ways—by changing the size of the buy 
price premium (the difference between the NCPB buy price and the market price in 
surplus producing regions); and by changing the size of the sell price premium (the 
difference between the NCPB sell price and the market price in consuming regions).  
Hence, we included two variables in the t p vector: (a) the buy price premium (measured 
as the difference between the administered NCPB purchase price and the wholesale 
market price in the major production area of Kitale); and (b) the sell price premium 
(measured as the difference between the administered NCPB sell price and the wholesale 
market price in the major consumption region of Nairobi). 
  For identification we follow Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Bernanke and 
Mihov (1998) and set  0 = 0 C .  As indicated above, this assumes market variables 
respond to policy changes with a lag but there is no contemporaneous response. This may 
seem like a strong restriction because it implies maize sellers and buyers respond to a 
change in the NCPB buy and sell price premiums, but it takes a full period (in our case a 
month) before they become fully aware of the change and start altering their behavior. 
However, there are a number of frictions that might preclude immediate adjustment.    6
First, in developing countries like Kenya access to market information tends to be 
sporadic and incomplete. Hence, it may take some time before buyers and sellers even 
become aware that the premiums have changed. Second, even when market participants 
become aware of the premium changes it may be costly and time consuming to alter their 
marketing channel because of adjustment costs and inertia. Therefore, the assumption 
that there is a least a one month delay in any market response to changes in NCPB buy 
and sell price premiums seems like a reasonable restriction in this context.  
Given that  0 = 0 C  is imposed there is no need for any identification restrictions 
on the market variables block (i.e. no need to restrict B  or 
y A ), as explained above.  For 
the policy block we use a Choleski factorization with the buy price premium ordered first 
and the sell price premium ordered second. 
4.   Data and Preliminary Results 
4.1 Data 
  The study uses monthly data from January 1989 through October 2004.  
Wholesale maize prices for Kitale and Nairobi were obtained from the Ministry of 
Agriculture’s Market Information Bureau. Wholesale maize prices for Mbale in eastern 
Uganda were obtained from the Ministry of Agriculture in Uganda. All prices are 
expressed in Kenyan Shillings per 90kg bag.  Ugandan prices were converted to Kenyan 
shillings using the official exchange rate and then adjusted upward by the official tariff 
rate in order to make then directly comparable to Kenyan prices. 
4.2 Diagnostic tests 
  Preliminary investigations focused on testing for seasonality and unit roots. 
Correlograms for both the price and policy variables displayed no strong evidence of 
seasonality and results provided later confirm that residuals from the VAR regressions 
without seasonal variables show no significant evidence of autocorrelation.  This is not 
unexpected because of the staggered harvest periods in different areas of Kenya, Uganda 
and Tanzania. 
Next, augmented Dickey–Fuller regressions were run for each price and policy 
variable to test for unit roots. One lagged dependent variable was sufficient to eliminate 
autocorrelation in the residuals in all of the Dickey-Fuller regressions, and a constant and   7
time trend were also included to account for any systematic deterministic components.  
Phillips-Perron tests were also applied as a consistency check.  A constant and a time 
trend were also allowed for in the Phillips-Perron tests, and the number of Newey-West 
lags was set to 4.  Results from both tests are shown in Table 1 and support stationarity in 
all variables, except perhaps the Nairobi maize price which has p-values of 0.083 under 
Dickey-Fuller and 0.154 under Phillips-Perron.  Even in this case, however, a unit root 
can be rejected using a 10% significance level under Dickey-Fuller (see Table 1). Given 
the general support for stationarity in the Kenyan maize price and policy variables, and 
the fact that estimation will still be consistent even if unit roots exist,
3 we estimate the 
VAR without imposing any unit root or cointegration restrictions. 
   
5.   Results 
 
5.1 VAR estimation results 
 
Given the preceding preliminary results, the VAR was specified in levels of the variables 
with no seasonality or trend terms. Standard VAR order selection criteria such as the 
Akaike information criterion and Schwartz Bayesian criterion (see Enders, 1995) all 
suggested a first-order model.  However, these criteria are known to underestimate lag-
length in some circumstances and likelihood ratio statistics suggested higher-order lags 
were needed.  Hence, we tested the residuals for autocorrelation using Ljung-Box Q 
statistics and found that both first- and second-order models had statistically significant 
autocorrelation in at least one set of residuals. We therefore expanded the model to third-
order lag and residuals from this model are well behaved in all cases. 
Model evaluation tests were conducted on the estimated VAR and results are 
provided in Table 2.  Ljung-Box Q tests support residuals from each equation having the 
white noise property.  The same test applied to the squared residuals supports no 
autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) in any residual series, except for 
the Kitale price equation which does show evidence of ARCH effects.  ARCH effects are 
                                                   
3 The reason is that least squares estimation of the VAR parameters remains consistent, even in the 
presence of unit roots and cointegration (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993).  It is only distribution theory 
(and therefore hypothesis testing) that is altered drastically.  But the VAR analyses of impulse response 
functions and policy simulation do not require formal hypothesis testing. 
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not modeled explicitly because they only appear in one equation and because parameter 
estimates remain consistent in the presence of conditional heteroscedasticity (Enders, 
1995).  We also tested for a linear trend term in each equation and this term was 
statistically insignificant at conventional significance levels in all equations except the 
Nairobi price equation. Trend terms were not modeled explicitly because they are only 
statistically significant in one equation and because it is often recommended not to 
include trend terms in VARs so that the dynamic interrelationships between variables 
remains as unrestricted as possible (Enders, 1995).  
5.2 Impulse response results 
  The economics underlying dynamic interrelationships between Kenyan maize 
price and policy variables is that buyers and sellers of maize have two alternative 
marketing channels to choose from—they can sell to or buy from the NCPB at 
administratively determined NCPB prices, or they can sell or buy through the private 
sector wholesale market channel at prices set by forces of supply and demand.  Clearly, 
relative prices in the two channels will be a major determinant of volume moving along 
each channel, and changing volumes in the market channel should influence market 
prices.  For example, if the NCPB raises its buy price above the market price in Kitale 
then we might expect more supply entering the NCPB channel and less supply entering 
the market channel. And as supply contracts in the marketing channel this should put 
upward pressure on market prices in Kitale.  Similarly, if the NCPB raises its sell price 
above the market price in Nairobi then we might expect less demand for NCPB maize 
and more demand for market sourced maize. 
  Nevertheless, volumes moving through the different marketing channels are not 
expected to depend solely on the price premiums, nor would we expect all of the 
adjustment to changes in price premiums to occur instantaneously.  There are many 
reasons besides price alone why sellers and buyers might choose a particular marketing 
channel over another.  These would include information gathering, learning, transaction 
costs and payment modalities associated with different channels, and the benefits of long-
term relationships (e.g. you might be excluded from participating later when the price 
differentials return to being favorable).  For these reasons we would expect a dynamic 
aggregate response to changing price premiums.   9
  The dynamic response of market prices to changes in NCPB buy and sell price 
premiums can be investigated using impulse response analysis which uses the moving 
average representation of the VAR to trace out the dynamic effect of shocks to the system 
on each of the variables in the system. Here we are interested in the dynamic response of 
market prices to shocks to the NCPB buy and sell price premiums. Based on the 
economic reasoning above we would expect positive shocks to the premiums to have 
positive effects on market prices, with the effect being spread over time as a result of 
adjustment costs from moving between marketing channels. 
  The response of Kitale and Nairobi maize prices to a one-time random shock in 
NCPB buy and sell price premiums are shown in Figure 1.  As expected, a positive shock 
to the buy price premium increases Kitale market prices, with the effect starting out 
small, getting gradually stronger over a seven month period, and then diminishing (but 
still positive) after that (see the top panel of Figure 1).  The second panel of Figure 1 
shows that the response of the Nairobi price to a positive shock in the buy price premium 
mirrors the positive effect on the Kitale price. The third panel of Figure 1 shows the 
response of the Nairobi price to a positive shock to the NCPB sell price premium. In this 
case, demand for product through the market channel should increase because this 
channel has become relatively cheaper, leading to the observed positive response in the 
Nairobi market price. The fourth and final panel of Figure 1 shows the effect of a shock 
to the sell price premium on the Kitale price.  
Overall, the impulse response results are quite consistent with economic logic and 
provide support for moving forward and using the VAR to estimate the historical effects 
of NCPB marketing activities.  
5.3 The estimated effects of NCPB marketing activities 
  Prices in the absence of the NCPB marketing channel were simulated by: (a) 
recursively constructing a set of counterfactual policy shocks that generate zero values 
for NCPB buy and sell price premiums over the entire sample period; (b) assuming that 
the shocks to the market variables remain at their estimated values over the sample 
period; and (c) constructing dynamic forecasts of the Kitale and Nairobi maize price 
paths under the counterfactual policy shocks and actual market shocks. The resulting 
estimated NCPB price effects are tabulated in Table 3 and graphed in Figure 2.    10 
  In the initial part of the sample period from April 1989 through May of 1992, 
prior to serious cereal market reform, NCPB marketing activities are estimated to have 
lowered average maize prices in both Kitale and Nairobi by approximately 17%, and also 
stabilized prices by reducing both the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation 
(CV) of prices over this period (see Table 3 and Figure 2).   During this initial period the 
NCPB set both their buy and sell prices persistently below market prices in Kitale and 
Nairobi, respectively.  Hence, over this initial period the NCPB added stability to the 
market and lowered average market prices significantly in both Kitale and Nairobi. 
The next part of the sample period from June 1992 through June 1995 contains 
two consecutive seasons of drought that pressured maize supplies in Kenya. During most 
of this period the NCPB set administered prices at steep discounts to market price levels, 
at least until mid-1994 when a good incoming harvest depressed market prices and turned 
the NCPB price from being at a discount to the market to being at a premium.  The steep 
discounts had the effect of keeping average market price in Kitale (Nairobi) 
approximately 27% (24%) lower over this period than it would have been in the absence 
of the NCPB channel (see Table 3 and Figure 2). 
  The final part of the sample period from July of 1995 through October of 2004 
corresponds to a period in which grain markets in Kenya were ostensibly liberalized and 
the NCPB was forced to take a more commercial stance in its operations. Yet Figure 2 
shows that the NCPB continued to buy and sell maize at substantial premiums to the 
market over most of this period. The net effect was to raise mean market prices in Kitale 
and Nairobi by approximately 21% over the period, and at the same time to reduce both 
the standard deviation and CV of prices (see Table 3 and Figure 2).  These estimated 
effects suggest that the NCPB has maintained a major influence on maize prices, despite 
the general perception that the market had been liberalized and despite the fact that the 
quantities traded by the NCPB are lower than in the pre-liberalization period. 
The effect of the NCPB over the entire sample period was to raise both average 
Kitale and average Nairobi prices (by approximately 5%) and also to stabilize prices by 
reducing their standard deviation and coefficient of variation over the sample period (see 
Table 3).    11 
This information can be combined with data on the pattern of maize purchases 
and sales from household-level surveys to draw inferences about the distributional 
consequences of government maize price policy.  Nationwide farm household surveys 
implemented during the 1990s and early 2000s consistently indicate that the majority of 
rural farm households in Kenya are net buyers of maize (which tend to be the relatively 
smaller and poorer farms) while roughly 10 percent of farms (generally larger) account 
for the majority of the maize marketed (see Nyoro, Jayne, and Kirimi, 2004).  This 
survey evidence indicates that the market price-raising effects of NCPB operations over 
the past decade have generally transferred income from (mostly poorer) maize purchasing 
rural households and urban consumers to larger maize-selling farms. 
6.   Conclusions 
The objective of this paper was to estimate the historical effects of NCPB maize 
marketing activities on wholesale maize market price levels and variability in Kenya.  
The analysis uses monthly maize price data covering the period January 1989 through 
October 2004.  Results are based on a VAR approach that allows estimation of a 
counterfactual set of maize prices that would have occurred over the 1989-2004 period 
had the NCPB marketing channel been eliminated.  
Results from counterfactual model simulations indicate that the NCPB’s activities 
have indeed had a marked impact on both maize price levels and variability.  The 
NCPB’s administered prices have, on average, raised wholesale market prices in Kitale (a 
major surplus production area) and Nairobi (the main urban center) by 4.6 and 5.2 
percent, respectively, over the entire sample period.  However, the NCPB’s impact on the 
market varied considerably between periods. The estimated effect was large and negative 
during the 1992/93 drought and 1993/94 when the NCPB was both buying and selling 
maize at major discounts to market prices.  Since the 1995/96 season, however, NCPB 
prices were mainly set at premiums to the market and their operations are estimated to 
have raised average Kitale and Nairobi maize prices by around 20%, implying a 
significant transfer of income from maize purchasing rural and urban households to 
relatively large farmers who account for roughly half of the country’s domestically 
marketed maize surplus. The NCPB’s activities have also reduced the standard deviation   12 
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Table 1.  Unit Root Test Results 






































           
 
Notes:     Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron values are Z(t) statistics with MacKinnon approximate p-
values for testing the null hypothesis of a unit root given in brackets under the statistic.  The number of lags 
included in the augmented Dickey-Fuller tests was 1 and the number of Newey-West lags used in the 




Table 2.  VAR Model Evaluation Results 

















         









































































           
 
Notes:     The AR (ARCH) residual tests are Ljung-Box Q tests for the relevant order autocorrelation in 
the residuals (squared residuals) of the series. The deterministic trend statistic is a t-value for testing the 
null hypothesis of no linear trend in each equation, with p-value in parentheses under the statistic.   14 




Period  Kitale wholesale  
maize price  
(Ksh per 90kg bag) 
   
 
Nairobi wholesale  
maize price 
(Ksh per 90kg bag) 
 
 
  Historical  Simulated  % 
difference    Historical  Simulated  % 
difference 
 
April 1989 – May 1992 
   Mean 
   Standard deviation 
































June 1992 – June 1995 
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   Standard deviation 


























July 1995 – October 2004 
   Mean 
   Standard deviation 



























Overall sample period  
(April 1989 – October 2004) 
   Mean 
   Standard deviation 

































Notes:  Historical refers to the historical data and simulated refers to estimated market prices in the absence 
of the NCPB marketing channel.  Percentage differences are the estimated effects of the NCPB policies 
(percentage deviation of the historical price statistics from their simulated values).    15 
   

























   

























   



























   





























Figure 1.  Impulse Responses   16 




































Figure 2.  Estimated Effects of NCPB Marketing Activities 
 